This was our dive bell while on the manson barge. there's 2 k bottle on board, a hook up for a bail out, and a regulator. Just in case. theres pictures of inside the dome below
2008/12/22
2008/12/21
At the office this weekend
The office this weekend consisted of a 300' barge with a 500 ton crane. We were putting a platform in place, then the weather wanted to bring 15' swells, which brought us home. here's some pictures of the tool shed, small crane, and the larger one. the last picture is of the barge in the back ground while we are leaving on a crew boat.
2008/12/17
Thursday night....
this is the Mars rigs being towed out to a new drill position. Mars is one of the largest rigs in the GOM
This is a rig being placed into position and matted up with it's anchors to hold it in place....I'm leaving Thursday night to work off a barge to have some of this fun.
water survival training.
This is an example of a survival training class for offshore workers. They teach hands how to manage in a life boat (black rubber boat with yellow cover in back)
They also teach the hands hot to escape a downed helicopter after it lands on the sea then tips over into the ocean. (blue box in water, it is flipped over here, you must remove the window and crawl out)
they also teach the hands how to swim, use their clothes as floats, and handle themselves in life vest while in the water.
2008/12/16
it's not that easy
The average of five deaths per year corresponds to a rate of 180 deaths per 100,000 employed divers per year, which is 40 times the national average death rate for all workers.
here is an essay written by a man who lost his son....he lost his job trying to make it safer for my community.
My Son Is Dead
By Mike McGrath
I am the father of Chandon Lee McGrath, a 22-year-old commercial diver who died in the Gulf of Mexico in 2006. My background includes over two decades of service with the U.S. Coast Guard including time spent chasing drug runners, rescuing those in peril on the sea, inspections, and most recently working for the Intelligence and Criminal Investigation part of the Coast Guard.
August 29, 2006 was the anniversary date (1 year to the day) of Hurricane Katrina, and most folks in the southern Louisiana area will remember that day for that reason, but our family will remember that day for another reason, the hurricane had claimed another life on that same date one year later. Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita had caused extensive damage throughout the Gulf of Mexico, as many of you reading this are aware. This is our story and is written to start bringing this incident into the light.
My son, Chandon, 22 years of age, was a part of a diving crew aboard the DSV Global Explorer, working in East Cameron block 346, on a jobsite where they were attempting to raise portions of the jack-up rig “Rowan Halifax” which had sunk to the bottom during Hurricane Katrina.
It was an ordinary Tuesday on the Gulf of Mexico according to most accounts. It was hot and sunny, humid with a slight wind blowing across the water and work on the Rowan Halifax was progressing well aboard the ship. The prime contractor on the job was relatively new to the Gulf of Mexico, but had years of experience conducting salvage operations on the Mississippi River. This job was important because it was an insurance job. Rowan’s insurance company was footing the bill and they wanted to ensure that work was progressing along at a pretty rapid clip, while maintaining a degree of safety along the way. Rowan was locking horns with the insurance company and the details of that lawsuit can be found here on the internet: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=40495. As a part of their requirement to ensure their precious cargo was being handled appropriately and professionally, they had an ROV team onboard to capture the entire salvage operation, use the ROV as a second set of eyes, reinforcing the safety of the operation while capturing the history of the operation for future use if necessary. The divers onboard the vessel had been supplied by 2 companies that had limited experience in the Gulf of Mexico and would be categorized by most as “Inland” divers.
According to the dive team members that I personally talked with, the accident that cost my son’s life started earlier that day when the dive team and their supervisor had their daily team meeting to discuss work for the day around 1100. It had been decided that they would get in as many dives as they could during the day because their normal night operations equipment was down, including lighting and the ROV. They wanted to play it safe. They dove 4 divers that afternoon and made great progress toward getting the next 30-foot section of the rig ready to be lifted.
That evening, work had progressed so well that it was decided to put one more diver in the water and try to complete the process of attaching the chain to that portion of the rig, making it ready to lift from the bottom. By their own account, the decision to deviate from their earlier plan put my son Chandon as the next diver up in the rotation. He should have questioned that decision based on the fact that deviating from any plan has its risks, but he was young and wanted to do what he was told. What follows is a series of events that we believe caused his death on that dive, that night. We have a copy of the video that was captured by the hat cam, and many of the details come from that video. I also personally talked with several members of the dive crew, and other divers who have viewed that video with us.
Chandon got dressed in pretty quickly on the dive deck as night was falling, it was 8:22 pm and Chandon wanted to get in the water and get his job done. He put the company owned KM-37 on his head that night, the one that had been reported as possibly defective earlier on that month; climbed onto the bell and was lowered to the water line. There is a slight pause as the lowering operation stops, and then he is raised back out of the water. Fully dressed in, he stayed standing in the bell while something was happening on deck. Nobody could tell us why he came back up or what was going on, but Chandon had to wait while this all went on for about 6 minutes, in his gear, hot and I imagine a bit frustrated. One of his buddies gives him a bottle of water and he appears to lean forward and pours it down his back in an attempt to cool off. He makes a few hand motions and just as suddenly as he had been lifted out of the water, he was lifted up and lowered back into the water on the bell.
As he drops below the surface, his light on his hat is turned on and he begins descending down to his work site. When Chandon got to his worksite, some 225’ below the surface, it is evident that there are some lines occupying his workspace; 1) his umbilical, 2) a crane line with chain attached to the end, 3) and another utility line of some sort. There is a current flowing and he struggles to keep his orientation and bearing during his work in the current. Most of the work had been completed, all Chandon had to do was assist the 4” chain around the teeth in the rig and connect it to the shackle that was awaiting it at the end of the crane line. The orientation of the chain to the shackle was off, and he struggled to get the two into the right alignment so that he could attach them together. The crew above “airmailed” him a very large pry bar, down this other utility line and he quickly gets underneath some of the equipment down below so that he wouldn’t get hit in the head when the pry bar reached the end of the line. Once it arrived he made quick work of getting it loose from the line that it came down on, grabbed it and took it down to the job site. He works and works to get that chain around those teeth with that pry bar and finally gets it. He is now within inches of having the chain link inside of that shackle. You can almost feel the excitement as he continues to work, struggle, pull and push that chain to get it into the shackle. In some scenes he is completely underneath the chain, body is horizontal as he struggles to work this thing into place.
According to the video and digital timing on the video, as Chandon struggles to get the chain in the shackle, there comes a point where he simply lays down the chain and begins to climb the crane line, its exactly 20:50:20 pm, hand over hand directly in front of his hat camera. We can see his hands the entire time. We believe he got about 20 feet up the line, probably going for the bell, somehow the hat comes off, its exactly 20:50:39 and the orientation of the hat cam turns upside down, all effort ceases and he begins to slowly drift to the bottom. By minute 20:51 he is laying on the bottom, having drifted back down, and there is no more movement until the standby diver shows up. All of this is clearly seen from his hat cam. My theory is that he was on an out-breath when something went wrong, possibly filling the hat with water, and with limited time, he tried to put together a solution and simply ran out of time. The reason for my assertion is that I knew Chandon very well; he was incredibly strong and athletic. In talking with several other divers who knew Chandon, we all came to this conclusion, reasoning that if Chandon had gotten a good breath in, he should have been able to make it to the bell, approximately 30 feet up with plenty of breath left to tap his emergency gas on the bell.
Eyewitness accounts on deck reveal that he had told those personnel topside in a gurgling voice, “Oh God, Oh God”! The supervisor topside tried to tell him to max out his free flow valve, maybe thinking that the extra air would clear the hat. In watching the video several hundred times, it appears that Chandon never tried to do that, or use his bailout, and the diver’s pneumo was never charged – in essence all three of his sources for breathing gas failed him in some way, or he believed that they wouldn’t work. He was obviously thinking he needed to get to the bell for emergency gas. There has been much debate about what happened that night, some say he took his hat off, some say it popped off, some say it was his inexperience that caused him to panic, some say it was some mystery that nobody has figured out yet. The Navy Experimental Diving Unit issued their report after inspecting the hat, claiming there was nothing wrong with the hat. When asked, they claimed that they were unable to recreate the accident. This event happened very quickly and with so many possible factors, the exact cause of the hat coming off of his head could not be definitively determined.
Apparently there was confusion on the surface as to what was going on below. Repeated attempts were made to contact Chandon with negative results. At some point, the standby diver was alerted. We were told the standby diver wasn’t completely ready and it took 3 attempts to get the hat on him and get him over the side. It was about 5 minutes before anybody showed up to retrieve Chandon from the bottom. The video that we have cuts off at 20:59:02 and he is still in the water being pulled to the surface, at least 8 minutes from the time his body goes lifeless. Once they had him onboard there was some confusion as to what to do with him. Some wanted to begin resuscitation efforts immediately upon him hitting the deck, others wanted to send him and the rescuers directly into the chamber. As the discussion played out, time was ticking away. Finally, somebody in charge decided to make them all get into the chamber, where they were told to conduct resuscitation efforts, without the help of any electronic assistance (defibrillator) due to the oxygen rich environment in the chamber. They worked on him for over an hour until the Doc told them over the phone to stop their efforts. These guys were heroes as far as I’m concerned.
The experience in the chamber was less than ideal. There were two dive medics put into the chamber with Chandon, both were highly qualified and had years of experience on fire rescue and Special Forces medicine as well as dive medicine. Once they were in the chamber, the ship cut its lines and started sailing for port. Unfortunately, the way the compressors were positioned on the deck, and the course and weather conditions present that night allowed the exhaust from the ship to come into contact with the intake on the compressor attached to the chamber and contaminated air was put into the chamber, making everybody inside the chamber very sick. This is why I consider these guys heroes. They put their own lives on the line to try and save my son. They paid a price for that decision as well and I’ve been told that they still suffer from the CO poisoning that they experienced that night. But they continued to work on my son even though their own suffering was almost unbearable. Once the efforts to revive Chandon were finished, these guys were forced to endure approximately 12 more hours of suffering while they ran a double set of tables on them to try and alleviate the effects of the CO.
As the ship was sailing for port, the ass covering games began. A team of attorneys was flown to the ship by helicopter to debrief the crewmembers, evidence was collected, statements were taken and the Coast Guard was alerted. By the time CG investigators arrived, they discovered that all audio records were gone, and video records were missing. The ROV was down that night so nothing there; weeks later a short version of the dive video surfaced. Through the persistent efforts of our attorney, Bobby Delise, we were able to finally get a copy of a shortened version of the video. As a side note, without Bobby, we would have been screwed. I don’t say that lightly, if you get hurt or someone you know gets dead, consider the professionals you would want in your corner carefully, as you’ll be in for the fight of your lives as we were. We now have a copy of that video. The senior leader of the prime contractor denied any evidence tampering when asked. We were fortunate, in my opinion, to have a least a part of the video preserved. This has helped us to understand that whatever happened, he was calm, cool, collected and was thinking. He was thinking about what to do to solve his urgent problem. It has showed us that his death was quick and, we hope painless. We can’t hear anything during this whole production and were told early on in the process that the audio was “lost”.
From my perspective, I think all of you can see that there were many factors that contributed to my son’s death. A series of errors all strung together to create tragedy. It could have been simple hat maintenance procedures not being followed all the way to the dive crew being completely unprepared for what they experienced. They obviously hadn’t practiced, drilled or trained for emergencies. I’m not assigning blame to any of them, they have all been through enough already and I care about them. We all have to live with this tragedy, not just the family. However, through my own investigations I’ve learned that these same conditions exist in many places in the Gulf of Mexico. Many of you are tempting death everyday. Please, become expert in your craft and cover you’re asses before every dive.
I could fill in many more details but I’m writing this in an effort to challenge each of you. I purposely wanted to create more questions than answers because my son is gone, he’s never coming back, but you are all still alive who read this article. I want you to ask yourselves everyday: Am I fully prepared to do this job? Are the conditions right? Do I trust my fellow divers, supervisor and deck crew with my life? Is my equipment well maintained and safe, and do we all know what to do in an emergency situation? These questions should constantly be running through your heads – and believe me, I used to tell Chandon the same thing. I’ve spent a couple of decades in the maritime environment and I know exactly how dangerous it can be.
Please stay safe; learn from those who have gone before you and stay alive.
My email address is mikemcgrat@gmail.com. I am interested in answering whatever questions you may have, or filling in other details if any of you have any good questions and need more details to better understand what happened that horrible night.
Mike McGrath
This article was published in Offshore Diver Magazine, Issue #5, 2007. See also McGrath, Chandon.
Since the death of Mike's son and his subsequent exposure to the Coast Guard's bungling ways of diving accident investigation, he has been heartily and publicly championing the cause that Coast Guard inspectors must be able to comprehend commercial diving if they are to regulate it. He has been unhesitatingly calling them out for their ineptitude. They recently fired him.
Mike's efforts are partially chronicled here: www.cgblog.org/. Search for the keyword "Chandon". An extract from some of the information you will find follows: "My understanding is that a chief and a JG were assigned to conduct and investigation. There has been some talk, and some indication, that they are being told by their seniors to wrap up the investigation as it is 'an easy one' with a 'young, inexperienced diver.'"
By Mike McGrath
I am the father of Chandon Lee McGrath, a 22-year-old commercial diver who died in the Gulf of Mexico in 2006. My background includes over two decades of service with the U.S. Coast Guard including time spent chasing drug runners, rescuing those in peril on the sea, inspections, and most recently working for the Intelligence and Criminal Investigation part of the Coast Guard.
August 29, 2006 was the anniversary date (1 year to the day) of Hurricane Katrina, and most folks in the southern Louisiana area will remember that day for that reason, but our family will remember that day for another reason, the hurricane had claimed another life on that same date one year later. Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita had caused extensive damage throughout the Gulf of Mexico, as many of you reading this are aware. This is our story and is written to start bringing this incident into the light.
My son, Chandon, 22 years of age, was a part of a diving crew aboard the DSV Global Explorer, working in East Cameron block 346, on a jobsite where they were attempting to raise portions of the jack-up rig “Rowan Halifax” which had sunk to the bottom during Hurricane Katrina.
It was an ordinary Tuesday on the Gulf of Mexico according to most accounts. It was hot and sunny, humid with a slight wind blowing across the water and work on the Rowan Halifax was progressing well aboard the ship. The prime contractor on the job was relatively new to the Gulf of Mexico, but had years of experience conducting salvage operations on the Mississippi River. This job was important because it was an insurance job. Rowan’s insurance company was footing the bill and they wanted to ensure that work was progressing along at a pretty rapid clip, while maintaining a degree of safety along the way. Rowan was locking horns with the insurance company and the details of that lawsuit can be found here on the internet: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=40495. As a part of their requirement to ensure their precious cargo was being handled appropriately and professionally, they had an ROV team onboard to capture the entire salvage operation, use the ROV as a second set of eyes, reinforcing the safety of the operation while capturing the history of the operation for future use if necessary. The divers onboard the vessel had been supplied by 2 companies that had limited experience in the Gulf of Mexico and would be categorized by most as “Inland” divers.
According to the dive team members that I personally talked with, the accident that cost my son’s life started earlier that day when the dive team and their supervisor had their daily team meeting to discuss work for the day around 1100. It had been decided that they would get in as many dives as they could during the day because their normal night operations equipment was down, including lighting and the ROV. They wanted to play it safe. They dove 4 divers that afternoon and made great progress toward getting the next 30-foot section of the rig ready to be lifted.
That evening, work had progressed so well that it was decided to put one more diver in the water and try to complete the process of attaching the chain to that portion of the rig, making it ready to lift from the bottom. By their own account, the decision to deviate from their earlier plan put my son Chandon as the next diver up in the rotation. He should have questioned that decision based on the fact that deviating from any plan has its risks, but he was young and wanted to do what he was told. What follows is a series of events that we believe caused his death on that dive, that night. We have a copy of the video that was captured by the hat cam, and many of the details come from that video. I also personally talked with several members of the dive crew, and other divers who have viewed that video with us.
Chandon got dressed in pretty quickly on the dive deck as night was falling, it was 8:22 pm and Chandon wanted to get in the water and get his job done. He put the company owned KM-37 on his head that night, the one that had been reported as possibly defective earlier on that month; climbed onto the bell and was lowered to the water line. There is a slight pause as the lowering operation stops, and then he is raised back out of the water. Fully dressed in, he stayed standing in the bell while something was happening on deck. Nobody could tell us why he came back up or what was going on, but Chandon had to wait while this all went on for about 6 minutes, in his gear, hot and I imagine a bit frustrated. One of his buddies gives him a bottle of water and he appears to lean forward and pours it down his back in an attempt to cool off. He makes a few hand motions and just as suddenly as he had been lifted out of the water, he was lifted up and lowered back into the water on the bell.
As he drops below the surface, his light on his hat is turned on and he begins descending down to his work site. When Chandon got to his worksite, some 225’ below the surface, it is evident that there are some lines occupying his workspace; 1) his umbilical, 2) a crane line with chain attached to the end, 3) and another utility line of some sort. There is a current flowing and he struggles to keep his orientation and bearing during his work in the current. Most of the work had been completed, all Chandon had to do was assist the 4” chain around the teeth in the rig and connect it to the shackle that was awaiting it at the end of the crane line. The orientation of the chain to the shackle was off, and he struggled to get the two into the right alignment so that he could attach them together. The crew above “airmailed” him a very large pry bar, down this other utility line and he quickly gets underneath some of the equipment down below so that he wouldn’t get hit in the head when the pry bar reached the end of the line. Once it arrived he made quick work of getting it loose from the line that it came down on, grabbed it and took it down to the job site. He works and works to get that chain around those teeth with that pry bar and finally gets it. He is now within inches of having the chain link inside of that shackle. You can almost feel the excitement as he continues to work, struggle, pull and push that chain to get it into the shackle. In some scenes he is completely underneath the chain, body is horizontal as he struggles to work this thing into place.
According to the video and digital timing on the video, as Chandon struggles to get the chain in the shackle, there comes a point where he simply lays down the chain and begins to climb the crane line, its exactly 20:50:20 pm, hand over hand directly in front of his hat camera. We can see his hands the entire time. We believe he got about 20 feet up the line, probably going for the bell, somehow the hat comes off, its exactly 20:50:39 and the orientation of the hat cam turns upside down, all effort ceases and he begins to slowly drift to the bottom. By minute 20:51 he is laying on the bottom, having drifted back down, and there is no more movement until the standby diver shows up. All of this is clearly seen from his hat cam. My theory is that he was on an out-breath when something went wrong, possibly filling the hat with water, and with limited time, he tried to put together a solution and simply ran out of time. The reason for my assertion is that I knew Chandon very well; he was incredibly strong and athletic. In talking with several other divers who knew Chandon, we all came to this conclusion, reasoning that if Chandon had gotten a good breath in, he should have been able to make it to the bell, approximately 30 feet up with plenty of breath left to tap his emergency gas on the bell.
Eyewitness accounts on deck reveal that he had told those personnel topside in a gurgling voice, “Oh God, Oh God”! The supervisor topside tried to tell him to max out his free flow valve, maybe thinking that the extra air would clear the hat. In watching the video several hundred times, it appears that Chandon never tried to do that, or use his bailout, and the diver’s pneumo was never charged – in essence all three of his sources for breathing gas failed him in some way, or he believed that they wouldn’t work. He was obviously thinking he needed to get to the bell for emergency gas. There has been much debate about what happened that night, some say he took his hat off, some say it popped off, some say it was his inexperience that caused him to panic, some say it was some mystery that nobody has figured out yet. The Navy Experimental Diving Unit issued their report after inspecting the hat, claiming there was nothing wrong with the hat. When asked, they claimed that they were unable to recreate the accident. This event happened very quickly and with so many possible factors, the exact cause of the hat coming off of his head could not be definitively determined.
Apparently there was confusion on the surface as to what was going on below. Repeated attempts were made to contact Chandon with negative results. At some point, the standby diver was alerted. We were told the standby diver wasn’t completely ready and it took 3 attempts to get the hat on him and get him over the side. It was about 5 minutes before anybody showed up to retrieve Chandon from the bottom. The video that we have cuts off at 20:59:02 and he is still in the water being pulled to the surface, at least 8 minutes from the time his body goes lifeless. Once they had him onboard there was some confusion as to what to do with him. Some wanted to begin resuscitation efforts immediately upon him hitting the deck, others wanted to send him and the rescuers directly into the chamber. As the discussion played out, time was ticking away. Finally, somebody in charge decided to make them all get into the chamber, where they were told to conduct resuscitation efforts, without the help of any electronic assistance (defibrillator) due to the oxygen rich environment in the chamber. They worked on him for over an hour until the Doc told them over the phone to stop their efforts. These guys were heroes as far as I’m concerned.
The experience in the chamber was less than ideal. There were two dive medics put into the chamber with Chandon, both were highly qualified and had years of experience on fire rescue and Special Forces medicine as well as dive medicine. Once they were in the chamber, the ship cut its lines and started sailing for port. Unfortunately, the way the compressors were positioned on the deck, and the course and weather conditions present that night allowed the exhaust from the ship to come into contact with the intake on the compressor attached to the chamber and contaminated air was put into the chamber, making everybody inside the chamber very sick. This is why I consider these guys heroes. They put their own lives on the line to try and save my son. They paid a price for that decision as well and I’ve been told that they still suffer from the CO poisoning that they experienced that night. But they continued to work on my son even though their own suffering was almost unbearable. Once the efforts to revive Chandon were finished, these guys were forced to endure approximately 12 more hours of suffering while they ran a double set of tables on them to try and alleviate the effects of the CO.
As the ship was sailing for port, the ass covering games began. A team of attorneys was flown to the ship by helicopter to debrief the crewmembers, evidence was collected, statements were taken and the Coast Guard was alerted. By the time CG investigators arrived, they discovered that all audio records were gone, and video records were missing. The ROV was down that night so nothing there; weeks later a short version of the dive video surfaced. Through the persistent efforts of our attorney, Bobby Delise, we were able to finally get a copy of a shortened version of the video. As a side note, without Bobby, we would have been screwed. I don’t say that lightly, if you get hurt or someone you know gets dead, consider the professionals you would want in your corner carefully, as you’ll be in for the fight of your lives as we were. We now have a copy of that video. The senior leader of the prime contractor denied any evidence tampering when asked. We were fortunate, in my opinion, to have a least a part of the video preserved. This has helped us to understand that whatever happened, he was calm, cool, collected and was thinking. He was thinking about what to do to solve his urgent problem. It has showed us that his death was quick and, we hope painless. We can’t hear anything during this whole production and were told early on in the process that the audio was “lost”.
From my perspective, I think all of you can see that there were many factors that contributed to my son’s death. A series of errors all strung together to create tragedy. It could have been simple hat maintenance procedures not being followed all the way to the dive crew being completely unprepared for what they experienced. They obviously hadn’t practiced, drilled or trained for emergencies. I’m not assigning blame to any of them, they have all been through enough already and I care about them. We all have to live with this tragedy, not just the family. However, through my own investigations I’ve learned that these same conditions exist in many places in the Gulf of Mexico. Many of you are tempting death everyday. Please, become expert in your craft and cover you’re asses before every dive.
I could fill in many more details but I’m writing this in an effort to challenge each of you. I purposely wanted to create more questions than answers because my son is gone, he’s never coming back, but you are all still alive who read this article. I want you to ask yourselves everyday: Am I fully prepared to do this job? Are the conditions right? Do I trust my fellow divers, supervisor and deck crew with my life? Is my equipment well maintained and safe, and do we all know what to do in an emergency situation? These questions should constantly be running through your heads – and believe me, I used to tell Chandon the same thing. I’ve spent a couple of decades in the maritime environment and I know exactly how dangerous it can be.
Please stay safe; learn from those who have gone before you and stay alive.
My email address is mikemcgrat@gmail.com. I am interested in answering whatever questions you may have, or filling in other details if any of you have any good questions and need more details to better understand what happened that horrible night.
Mike McGrath
This article was published in Offshore Diver Magazine, Issue #5, 2007. See also McGrath, Chandon.
Since the death of Mike's son and his subsequent exposure to the Coast Guard's bungling ways of diving accident investigation, he has been heartily and publicly championing the cause that Coast Guard inspectors must be able to comprehend commercial diving if they are to regulate it. He has been unhesitatingly calling them out for their ineptitude. They recently fired him.
Mike's efforts are partially chronicled here: www.cgblog.org/. Search for the keyword "Chandon". An extract from some of the information you will find follows: "My understanding is that a chief and a JG were assigned to conduct and investigation. There has been some talk, and some indication, that they are being told by their seniors to wrap up the investigation as it is 'an easy one' with a 'young, inexperienced diver.'"
2008/12/14
The Bell
A diving bell was originally made to bring people into the depths of the ocean in order to collect sponges or other sea life. Then the idea of doing construction work underwater was made, and the rest is history. In any diving operation that is either in rough or cold seas, or extreme depths a bell is lowered. It gives shelter to the diver when not in the water, or allows the divers inside to be kept under pressure allowing the body to act as if it was at a certain dept. Saturation divers use them everyday. they usually are not very comfortable places to be in and just because they offer safety it doesn't mean they are very safe.
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